...Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898 -- "A Cause for Indignation" ...                                                                                                       ...Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948 -- "A Cause for Celebration" ...

CONTENTS OF THIS BOOK:

 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY  

 FEEDBACK RECEIVED 

 AUTHOR'S INTRO 

 CHAPTER 1 
UDHR '48: A Cause for Celebration

 CHAPTER 2 
TP '98: A Cause for Indignation

Motive & Conduct of US War with Spain

Conditions in the Philippines

Early American Deception

Mock Battle and its Aftermath

More Duplicity

Aug.13: Historic Date Between Centuries

Negotiating and Signing the Treaty

Reactions to Signed Treaty

US Domestic Moves for Ratification

Precarious Vote Ratifies Pact

App 2-A: Text of Treaty of Paris, 1898  

App 2-B: War to Enforce the Sale

 CHAPTER3 
Decade-old Document Dissected

 CHAPTER 4 

Response to the Spanish Response

 CHAPTER 5 

Response to the American Non-Response

 EPILOGUE 1 

Demands of Dignity 

  EXCERPTS: 

-o0o-  

"The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed Dec. 10, 1948, has been a cause of celebration, and the Treaty of Paris, signed Dec. 10, 1898, has been a cause for indignation...   on the part of ALL  HUMANS."

-o0o-  

"The HUMANITY of ALL is ONE!  Assaults on the Rights of a human anywhere are assaults on the rights of all humans everywhere."

-o0o-

"The current Human Evolutionary Imperative is attaining Synergy in Conscious Oneness."

-o0o-

"We demand apologies not to uphold our national dignity, but to give the offenders the opportunity to uphold theirs."

-o0o-

"Demands for Human Dignity come from within Human Dignity itself."

-o0o-

"We seek redress, closure and healing...  Since the governments involved and the international organizations that depend on the consent of governments cannot be expected to support these calls or accord them any serious attention, we are calling upon the citizens of these and other nations, on the citizenry of the world."

-o0o-

"One of the factors underpinning the habit of trying to hide or mangle the truth is the illusion that facts hidden well enough as secrets can stay as such forever. Another is the illusion that you can harm your fellow-humans without harming yourself."

-o0o-

"Inevitably, eventually and ultimately, all wrongs cry out to be fully acknowledged, regretted, and set aright. Your peace of mind now and in the future demands it. Your very dignity demands it."

-o0o-

"Smile for Synergy! Seek One Humanity!"

  LINKS TO THE MAIN PARTS OF THE Demands of Dignity BOOK: 

Introductory Essay by Bernard Karganilla, Kamalaysayan chair

Introduction: Campaigning for Deeper, Broader Discourse

CHAPTERS: Introduction  Ch.1  Ch.2  Ch.3  Ch.4  Ch.5 Epilogue

Bibliography    Alphabetical Index    Publication Information

The Author: Ed Aurelio Reyes    The Publisher: Kamalaysayan   

GENERAL FEEDBACK    SPECIFIC FEEDBACK     FEEDBACK BOX

  Chapter Two

  --------------------- 

TP 1898:

 A Cause for Indignation

WHAT IS WIDELY REFERRED TO in Philippine history as the Treaty of Paris¹ is not the only, and is not the first, Treaty of Paris in broader human history.  It is not even really officially titled that way; the actual heading of the document is “Treaty of Peace.”

The French capital city seems to have been a favorite venue for signing important treaties. One such “Treaty of Paris” came to be also called “Peace of Paris.” It was signed on February 10, 1763 by the Kingdoms of France, Great Britain, Spain and Portugal to end the French and Indian War, also known as the Seven Years’ War.  Twenty years later, on September 3, 1783, another “Treaty of Paris” was signed between the 13 British colonies in North America and the Kingdom of Great Britain, formally ending the American Revolutionary War.  This clarification is being made here to address a possible source of confusion. 

The Treaty of Paris referred to here was the one with a similar-sounding official title – “Treaty of Peace” – seeking as it did seek to reestablish peace between the United States and Spain, signed on December 10, 1898 to formally end the grossly lopsided Spanish-American War, providing for the disposition of arbitrarily-involved properties, possessions, and even supposed possessions mainly of Spain, and completely excluding from the signing  and even from any part of the negotiation process the slightest participation of the main stake-holders, the peoples of the Philippines and their respective home territories. 

Prelude to the negotiation, signing and ratification of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 has been the unfolding of firm decision on the part of the US to consistently pursue a  policy of expanding its external markets.  This explains all the official acts of the government of the United States pertinent to grabbing the just-liberated Philippines and forcibly transforming it from being a Spanish colony into an American one. 

This chapter shows how in its preparation, contents and forcible implementation this treaty has been a cause of indignation not only among the informed Filipinos but also on the part of other people who know the value of upholding human rights as part of the dignity shared by all humans everywhere.  After all, the Humanity of all is one, and assaults on the rights of some are assaults on the rights of all.

Motive and Conduct of US War with Spain

What could have moved the United States, a former colony – after highlighting “self-evident” principles on human equality and self-determination in its Declaration of Independence – to pursue the status of an empire with its own colonies?  This narration from Howard Zinn is enlightening:

“(In the) year of the massacre at Wounded Knee, 1890, it was officially declared by the Bureau of the Census that the internal frontier was closed. The profit system, with its natural tendency for expansion, had already begun to look overseas. The severe depression that began in 1893 strengthened an idea developing within the political and financial elite of the country: that overseas markets for American goods might relieve the problem of underconsumption at home and prevent the economic crises that in the 1890s brought class war.

“And would not a foreign adventure deflect some of the rebellious energy that went into strikes and protest movements toward an external enemy? Would it not unite people with government, with the armed forces, instead of against them? This was probably not a conscious plan among most of the elite — but a natural development from the twin drives of capitalism and nationalism.” ²

Back in 1853, after the US beat the British in their race to open up Japan, President John Quincy Adams was described by book author Professor George Taylor as having “considered the Chinese anti-commercial policy as a crime against the free intercourse of nations. He put his finger on the real issue; China and Japan had to be brought into the world market for our good, not their own.”³  (Emphasis mine)

By 1897, Theodore Roosevelt wrote to a friend: “In strict confidence . . . I should welcome almost any war, for I think this country needs one.”⁴

As quoted by Prof. Renato Constantino, author John W. Foster reminds his readers of the prophetic words of W.H. Seaward, who had said:

“We are rising to another and more sublime stage of national progress – that is expanding wealth and rapid territorial aggrandizement.  Our institutions throw a broad shadow across the St. Lawrence, and stretching beyond the valley of Mexico; reaches even to the plains of central America; while the Sandwich Islands and the Shores of China recognize its renovating influence.  Whenever that influence is felt, a desire for protection under these institutions is awakened…. Commerce has brought the ancient continents near to us and created necessities for new positions – perhaps connections or colonies there.” ⁵

Sen. Alfred Beveridge was publicly emphasizing China’s “illimitable markets” for US goods just beyond the Philippines.  He claimed the Pacific for possession by the Americans.  Beveridge said, “The Pacific is our ocean,” he said. Answering his own rhetorical question as to where to turn for consumers of the surplus produce of US industries, he pointed out that possession of the Philippines “gave us a US base at the door of all Asia.”⁶ 

A year after the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in February 1899, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge would say at the Philadelphia Republican Convention of 1900 that:

“We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in trade expansion.”⁷

Various geopolitical and domestic considerations were at play in shaping the American policy that led to the Spanish American War, the taking of the Philippines, and its retention as an American colony.  These include the Cuban Crisis, starting with American sympathies toward the Cubans who were severely being oppressed under Spanish colonization; the political calculations being made by the group of President William McKinley; and the pendulum-swinging battle for broader public opinion between the industrialists desirous of expanded markets well beyond the domestic market, and the groups – notably the members of the Massachusetts-based Anti-Imperialist League — who chose to be faithful to the ideals that the Founding Fathers had enshrined in the American Declaration of Independence and Constitution.

Of the Anti-Imperialist League, Daniel Boone Schirmer describes what developed as a reciprocal relationship of mutual growth with the nationalist movement of the Filipinos in the Islands:

“It was the (initial assembly of anti-imperialists) at Faneuil Hall that took the first step toward transforming what had been a matter of individual protest against the Spanish War into an organized movement, and Boston men got this meeting together only after hints in the press that the McKinley administration was tempted by (prospects of colonizing) the Philippines.  Later, the open avowal of the Administration’s intent to annex those islands led to the organization of the Anti-Imperialist League, and when the Filipinos then showed resistance to the United States occupation of their homeland, further impetus was given to the anti-imperialist movement.

“In turn, the movement that the anti-imperialists built in the United States gave political and moral support to Philippine independence, creating difficulties for the American imperialists in the execution of their program. The relationship that came about between American anti-imperialism and Philippine nationalism proved reciprocal in effect, and so it continued, with varying intensity, as long as did the movement that originated at Faneuil Hall. (This relationship was distorted by imperialist spokesmen so as to make it appear that American anti-imperialists were responsible for the Philippine struggle for independence.  Such assertions, frequently repeated, suggested a racist underestimation of the Filipinos on the part of those who made them, rather than the reality of the situation.  In truth, Philippines had (had) a flourishing movement for some time before organized American anti-imperialism saw the light of day, and would seem to have influenced the American anti-imperialists more than the latter did it.) (Emphasis supplied.)”⁸

The Cuban crisis led to the deployment and subsequent mysterious explosion and sinking of the USS Maine in the port of Havana that built up to the American declaration of war against the already spent colonial force that was Spain.

In his History as a Weapon, Howard Zinn shares:

“As Philip Foner says in his two-volume study The Spanish-Cuban-American War, ‘The McKinley Administration had plans for dealing with the Cuban situation, but these did not include independence for the island.’ He points to the administration’s instructions to its minister to Spain, Stewart Woodford, asking him to try to settle the war because it ‘injuriously affects the normal function of business, and tends to delay the condition of prosperity,’ but not mentioning freedom and justice for the Cubans. Foner explains the rush of the McKinley administration into war (its ultimatum gave Spain little time to negotiate) by the fact that ‘if the United States waited too long, the Cuban revolutionary forces would emerge victorious, replacing the collapsing Spanish regime’.”

In February 1898, the U.S. battleship Maine, in Havana harbor as a symbol of American interest in the Cuban events, was destroyed by a mysterious explosion and sank, with the loss of 268 men. There was no evidence ever produced on the cause of the explosion, but excitement grew swiftly in the United States, and McKinley began to move in the direction of war.” ⁹

Conditions in the Philippines

In the Philippines, meantime, after four years of solid political, spiritual and military preparation, the Filipinos had established an independent state, called “Haring Bayang Katagalugan” (Sovereign State of the River-dwellers) in August 1896,¹⁰ and immediately entered the state of belligerency when they launched a people-centered and people-powered revolutionary war that was waged in most of the Spanish-held provinces throughout the country, mainly in Luzon and the Visayas.¹¹

(Except for a Spanish toehold on the tip of the Zamboanga peninsula where the Spaniards were able to maintain a fort, Mindanao was ably defended and kept free by its indigenous inhabitants led by the largely-Muslim Moros; and these peoples had found common cause with the Filipinos against the Spaniards and the latter’s religious orders, some of which held parcels of landholdings here and there, like the Jesuit parishes in northwestern Mindanao where Jose Rizal was exiled for four years.)¹² 

Factional rivalry in one province developed into coup d’etat that unseated and eventually executed Andres Bonifacio, the moving spirit and practical leader of the revolutionary movement and elected President of the nascent state,¹³ but the Filipinos in most other provinces kept up the spirit of fighting for Philippine emancipation from more than three centuries of Spanish colonization. The usurpers of leadership, found their forces finally up against a significant Spanish force (earlier they could easily “liberate” town after town in their province because the Spanish colonial government was then just keeping a skeletal military presence there) and had to escape to another province before sur-rendering to the Spanish regime through a mediated “political set-tlement”¹⁴ that accorded for them (the leaders) money and passage to their place of exile: Hong Kong, then a British Crown colony in China.

Before boarding the ship to leave the Philippines, their leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo, shouted “Viva España!” and ordered the revolutionary forces to stop all fighting.  He said those who would persist in the struggle would be regarded as lowly bandits.  The Filipino people did not pay him heed. And while he was in Hong Kong the Filipinos fought on, systematically weakening the Spanish forces in the diminishing territories the latter still significantly held.  It was because of this progress in the uninterrupted struggle that the Americans saw something to be gained by making contact with Aguinaldo in Hong Kong.

Early American Deception

Aside from Commodore George Dewey, other US official func-tionaries also talked to him, all expressing interest in his options and actual decisions, and leading him to plainly understand that the US government was supportive of the Filipino struggle for independence.

From the column item written by Prof. Bernard L.M. Karganilla for the June 15, 2007 issue of the Malaya national newspaper, titled “Hobbled Sovereignty,” we learn of the following interludes, which the University of the Philippines - Manila (UP-M) history professor and Social Sciences Department chairperson, and also chairman of Kaisahan sa Kamalayan sa Kasaysayan (Solidarity on Sense of History) or Kamalaysayan, had culled from memoirs written by Aguinaldo:

“While grieving over the bad faith of the Spaniards in March 1898, Aguinaldo was visited by (Captain Wood,) commander of the U.S.S. Petrel, who urged him to return to the Philippines to renew hostilities against the Spaniards with the object of gaining Philippine independence. Did Aguinaldo need the Americans to egg him back to the fight?

“In Singapore, the U.S. Consul, Mr. Spencer Pratt, sought Aguinaldo who was also wooed by Admiral Dewey with the message that the United States would at least recognize the Independence of the Philippines under the protection of the U.S. Navy.

“Aguinaldo was as “anxious” as Admiral Dewey and the North American Consul ‘to be in the Philippines,' making him take “the opportunity afforded me by these representatives of the United States, and, placing the fullest confidence in their word of honor,’ pledged ‘to renew the struggle for our Independence.’

“Before Aguinaldo left Singapore, Consul (Spencer) Pratt ‘asked (the Filipino general) to appoint him Representative of the Philippines in the United States.’ In response, Aguinaldo (said he) intended to offer the American Consul ‘a high position in the Customs Department, besides granting certain commercial advantages.’

“Back in Hong Kong, Aguinaldo was met by (Consul) Wildman, the U.S. Consul, who ‘strongly advised (him) to establish a Dictatorship as soon as (he) arrived in the Philippines.’ Accepting the American's advice, Aguinaldo unveiled a Dictatorial Government on May 24, 1898.

“But before Aguinaldo proclaimed himself Dictator, he gave Consul Wildman $67,000 for the purchase of firearms for delivery ‘to (him) in the Philippines.’ What happened? (Aguinaldo was to state, with regret, later) that ‘Mr. Wildman has failed to comply with (his) request and (he was) informed that (Wildman) refuses to refund the money.

“Pratt in Singapore wanted Aguinaldo’s award of office, while Wildman at Hong Kong took Aguinaldo’s money and ran. The Americans still had more instructions for Aguinaldo. ‘Admiral (Dewey) advised me to at once have made a Filipino National Flag, which he said he would recognize and protect in the presence of the other nations represented by the various squadrons anchored in Manila Bay.’ Is this the reason why the June 12, 1898 Proclamation of Philippine Independence at Kawit enumerates the “colors of Blue, Red, and White” of the National Pennant as “commemorating the flag of the United States of America, as a manifestation of our profound gratitude towards this Great Nation?”

“In any case, Aguinaldo was told by Dewey at the end of June 1898 that the American naval officer had “allowed the Filipinos to display on their vessels a flag that was not recognized” by the German and French Admirals. Dewey was of the opinion that “the Filipinos deserved the right to use their flag.” Aguinaldo “thereupon expressed to the Admiral my unbounded gratitude for such unequivocal protection.”

“In July 1898, Dewey visited Cavite, asking Aguinaldo for a favor. ‘How pretty your flag is! It has a triangle, and is something like the Cubans’. Will you give me one as a memento when I go back home?’ The Dictator from Cavite replied that the American ‘could have one whenever he wished.’

“General (Thomas) Anderson, commander of the first U.S. military expedition that arrived in the Philippines on July 4, 1898, “solemnly and completely endorsed the promises made by Admiral Dewey” to Aguinaldo. Sadly, these promises were not kept.”¹⁵

About Captain Wood, it was not in his own initiative that he visited Aguinaldo in Hong Kong. Daniel Schirmer wrote in his book, Republic or Empire that:

“Sometime in March (on the eve of the Spanish-American War) Dewey sent Captain Wood of the gunboat Petrel to confer with Aguinaldo about the possibility of collaboration against Spain in the Philippines, and the next month such conferences were continued.

“On March 31, 1898, Dewey made his first written report to the Navy Department … (and) he told authorities that there were five thousand armed Filipino rebels waiting to assist the United States against Spain, and that once Manila was blockaded, the Spaniards could be driven from the Philippines by the insurgents or by United States forces.¹⁶

About Consul Pratt, and not in any way related to his having reportedly run away with Aguinaldo’s money as the latter later alleged, Filipino historian Renato Constantino tells us that he was officially scolded and later punished by the administration in Washington. Constantino writes that “Pratt was censured for a speech he gave to the Filipino colony in Singapore (where he was then posted). At that time, while the American troops were still on their way, Aguinaldo was already laying siege to the Spaniards in the walled city.” The Department of State letter reprimanding Pratt said:

“The address discloses an understanding on their part that the ultimate object of our action is the independence of the Philippines.  Your address does not repel this implication.” ¹⁷

The letter even censured Pratt for having called Aguinaldo “the man for the occasion,” and for having said that “the arrangement between Aguinaldo and Dewey had resulted so happily.”  Pratt was later separated from the consular service, the historian further says.

This author cannot imagine a US consul daring to make sensitive diplomatic moves solely on his own initiative, unless the U.S. government is ready to make us believe now that its bureaucracy and chain of command were then menaced by utter lack of discipline and inefficiency.  With the McKinley administration then getting into a “war footing” at the advent of expansionism and preparing to tackle Spain, such a lame excuse could not but be pathetically incredible.

At any rate, American official duplicity towards the overly trusting Filipinos was still to continue in the succeeding days, weeks, months, years… 

There was still another item in the American bag of tricks that came before the scripted Battle of Manila.  This involved an official tampering of the date of commencement of its declared war against Spain.  Technically, it may have been legal, but going by the very logic of declaring wars in the first place, it does not appear very honorable, to say the least.  Not that it could have altered the results of the Spanish-American War in any way.

This tampering of dates is very casually mentioned, with its tricky reason, in an article by David Trask, titled “The Spanish-American War,” uploaded in the website of the Hispanic Division of the US Library of Congress. The relevant paragraph follows:

“On 25 April Congress responded to McKinley’s request for armed intervention. Spain had broken diplomatic relations on 23 April. The American declaration of war was predated to 21 April to legitimize certain military operations that had already taken place, particularly a blockade of Havana. To emphasize that its sole motive at the beginning of the struggle was Cuban independence, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution, the Teller Amendment, that foreswore any intention of annexing Cuba.”¹⁸  (Emphasis mine)

The aggrieved party in this specific case of deception may have been more the U.S. citizens who would have had reason to expect their republican government to fully uphold and strictly implement their Constitution’s provisions on the principle of separation of powers as applied to declarations and actual acts of war.  As it apparently turned out, Congress agreed to join a collusion of powers, accepting responsibility for an act of war that the executive had ordered and implemented before Congress could decide to cloak it with the blessing of legality by officially declaring the war as soon as it actually could. 

Mock Battle and its Aftermath

Commodore Dewey had come to Hong Kong two months before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.  Constantino shares with us what author George F. Kennan wrote to explain why this could not at all have been surprising, especially at hindsight:

“We know that Theodore Roosevelt, who was then the young Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had long felt that (the Americans) ought to take the Philippines; that he wangled Dewey’s appointment to the command of the Asiatic Fleet; that both he and Dewey wanted war; and that he had some sort of a prior understanding with Dewey to the effect that Dewey would attack Manila, regardless of the circumstances of the origin or the purpose of the war.¹⁹

Wikipedia gives us a blow-by-blow account of the Battle of Manila Bay. Here are some of the highlights:²⁰ 

“The Battle of Manila Bay took place on 1 May 1898, during the Spanish-American War. The American Asiatic Squadron under Commodore George Dewey engaged the Spanish Pacific Squadron under Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón and destroyed the Spanish squadron. The engagement took place in Manila Bay, the Philippines, and was the first major engagement of the Spanish-American War

“Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón, who had been dispatched rapidly to the Philippines, was equipped with a variety of obsolete vessels. Efforts to fortify his position amounted to little. The corrupt Spanish colonial bureaucracy may have worked against the effort, sending explosives meant for mines to friendly construction companies. Reinforcements promised from Madrid resulted in only two poorly armored scout cruisers. Montojo compounded his difficulties by retreating from the range of Spanish fortress guns—guns that might have evened the odds—and choosing to anchor in a relatively shallow anchorage. His intent seems to have been to preserve the families of the Spanish sailors in Manila from bombardment, and to allow survivors of his fleet to swim to safety. The harbor was protected by four batteries.

“At daybreak on Sunday 1 May, George Dewey aboard the protected cruiser USS Olympia led a small squadron of ships into Manila Bay. Shortly after five a.m., the Spanish shore batteries and the Spanish fleet opened fire. At 5:40 with the now famous phrase, ‘You may fire when ready, Gridley,’ the Olympia’s captain was instructed to begin the barrage that resulted in the destruction of the Spanish flotilla.”

“…The eleven Spanish ships and five land batteries fought back for two and a half hours. The American ships withdrew at 7:45 a.m. to redistribute ammunition, then attacked again at 10:40. Most of the Spanish ships were either destroyed or surrendered. The Spanish colors were struck in surrender at 12:40 p.m. The results were decisive; Dewey won the battle with only a single fatality among his crew: Francis B. Randall, Chief Engineer on the McCulloch, from heart attack.”

Accounts on the Battle for Manila, the walled city, a little over 100 days later, were also replete with details.  But most of these accounts do not tell us why this event has since come to be widely known as a “mock battle,” a scripted one. This part of David Trask’s aforecited article actually does:

“Dewey hoped to avoid further hostilities at Manila. To this end he engaged in shadowy negotiations with a new Spanish governor in Manila and the Roman Catholic Bishop of the city. An agreement was reached whereby there would be a brief engagement between the Spanish and American forces followed immediately by surrender of the city, after which the Americans were to prevent Aguinaldo’s troops from entering Manila.”²¹ (Underscoring supplied.)

Additional details on the scripting process are given in the Wall of Heroes website:

“Inside the walled city of Manila, (the new Spanish Governor) General Jaudenes listened to the sound of the naval gunfire.  He wasn’t concerned.  He had already agreed with Admiral Dewey as to how the scenario would play out.  On his desk was a piece of paper, the only printed document related to the unfolding events.  It sketched out a series of signal flags that, when seen flying from Admiral Dewey’s ship, would indicate that it was time for the Spanish commander to order his men to hoist the while sheet over the city that would signify the final act in the mock battle for Manila.

“From August 8th to 12th, the opposing commanders had hammered out the details.  First, Jaudenes had requested a 48-hour delay in the threatened bombardment in order to obtain permission from Madrid to surrender the city.  Granted the delay by Dewey, Madrid refused to permit the surrender.  His fate all but sealed, Jaudenes was still more than willing to surrender but for two important details:

“1. It would be a disgraceful act for the Spanish commander to give up his city without a fight.  Such an act would be received with derision and probably court martial upon his return to his homeland.

“2. The Spanish were still quite fearful of the consequences if the city fell to Aguinaldo and his band of Filipino insurgents.

“Resolution of such matters was carefully crafted through the Belgium consul Edouard Andre.  In its final draft, the carefully choreographed sequence of events called for the initial shelling of the fort at Malate, which would be promptly abandoned by its defenders.  As the Americans then began their ground advance, Admiral Dewey would bring his ships before the city and hoist the signal flags demanding surrender.  Upon seeing these, General Jaudenes would order the white flag raised, and the Americans would enter.  As had been the case in Cuba, the word “surrender” was avoided to be replaced by the term ‘capitulation’.  

“The capitulation of Manila would transfer control to the invading American forces, which would then secure the city and deny entrance to the insurgent forces under Aguinaldo.  The brief, bloodless battle at San Antonio de Abad would save face for the Spanish soldiers and their commander, demonstrating that they had capitulated only after a devastating attack.”²² (Emphasis in the original)  

Also telltale on the American deception pattern is this account on dealings with Aguinaldo, which Dewey (who had already been promoted to Admiral) gave much later to the Senate Committee on the Philippines:

“I knew what he was doing.  Driving the Spaniards in was saving our troops … Up to the time the Army came, Aguinaldo did everything…requested.  He was always obedient, whatever I told him he did.  I saw him almost daily. I had not much to do with him after the Army came.” ²³

An article of Dr. Lilia H. Laurel published in the August 16, 1989 issue of the National Midweek magazine quotes a letter addressed to the American people written by Apolinario Mabini and published in La Independencia on July 21, 1898. The handicapped hero complained about the treatment they were subjected to by US military officers, who were their supposed allies:

“Always desirous of maintaining a good relationship with the newcomers, Aguinaldo wrote the General (Merritt), protesting, in friendly terms, the conduct observed towards the Filipinos. Merritt, by way of a reply, asked for the withdrawal of the Philippine forces from the towns (of Ermita, Paco, Malate and Pandacan), invoking the conditions of the capitulation that had been drawn up with the Spaniards. General Merritt sent Colonel Wildman as (unofficial) emissary to say that ‘the general was furious with Aguinaldo for not having placed himself under the order of the American generals, as stipulated in the agreement.” ²⁴

The Americans’ design to maintain their hold on the Philippines started to become very obvious.  For instance, when Dewey asked the White House to send him a reinforcement force of 5,000 troops, President McKinley sent him three times that:

“McKinley sent him a force of 15,085 enlisted men and 641 officers. The difference in the calculations of the two may easily be understood.  Dewey recommended 5,000 troops as all that would be necessary to ‘retain possession of Manila and thus control the Philippines.’ He assumed that he could count on the friendship of the people. ‘I had in view simply taking possession of the city,’ De-wey informed the Senate Committee in 1902. Dewey’s avowed posi-tion was that the United States would remain master of the situation only until the end of the war.  But McKinley had another purpose in sending three times the number of troops requested, for in his message to Congress, after describing the fall of Manila, he said, ‘By this the conquest of the Philippines…was formally sealed.” ²⁵

More Duplicity

Constantino shows other instances of American duplicity perpetrated against the Filipinos as, for instance, “seen in Major General Wesley Merritt’s handling of McKinley’s instructions on a number of administrative matters that would come after the surrender of Manila.”  The historian illustrates:

“Merritt issued a proclamation copying verbatim the instructions of McKinley, including passages which assured the people that the United States ‘has not come to wage war upon them…but to protect them in their homes, in their employment and in their personal and religious rights….’  But he omitted that part of the instructions which stated ‘the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and operate immediately upon the political condition of the inhabitants.’  Merritt (said he) had to do this because when he arrived, he found that Aguinaldo had already ‘proclaimed an independent government, Republican in form, with himself as President, and at the time of my arrival in the Islands the entire edifice of executive and legislative departments had been accomplished at least on paper’.” ²⁶

Merritt was most careful so that the real intentions and plans of his government would not be found out by the Filipinos.  Constantino gives another illustration:

“Brigadier General Thomas Anderson who arrived ahead of Gen. Merritt (felt he) also had to act within this framework of duplicity. When Aguinaldo asked him about the intention of the Americans, Anderson told Aguinaldo that ‘in 122 years, we had established no colonies.’  Aguinaldo then replied, ‘I have studied attentively the Constitution of the United States and I find in it no authority for colonies, and I have no fear.’  Anderson, commenting on this incident admitted, ‘It may seem that my answer was evasive, but I was at the time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, fuel and forage’.”²⁷

Actually, his response was not merely evasive because the effect it really sought was to fool the overcredulous Aguinaldo.  The excuse given could not deny that it was in effect an outright lie; it only sought to justify the lie, with fingers crossed, for the appeasement of his compatriots.

The US government was consistently seeking to deceive the American citizenry in a much bigger away. The historian quotes the sharply perceptive Judge James H. Blount:

“…a war of conquest to subjugate a remote people struggling to be free from the yoke of alien domination was sure to be more or less unpopular with many of the sovereign voters of a republic, and more dangerous therefore, like all unpopular wars, to the tenure of office of the party in power. So that in entering upon a war of conquest, a republic must ‘play politics,’ using the military arm of the government for the two-fold purpose of crushing opposition and proving that there is none.” ²⁸

Aug. 13: Historic Date Between Centuries

General Merritt was suspicious of the previously mentioned deal about the scripting of the Battle of Manila, but the Spanish side actually complied with its commitments in the deal, specifically the part about readily surrendering the walled capital city (Intramuros). Spain complied not necessarily out of a sense of honor but more logically out of its having been effectively intimidated by the US superior power as effectively displayed in previous months.  Merritt had had big reasons to be suspicious.  One who is not trustworthy cannot be expected to be readily trusting.

Trask informs us that “on 12 August, McKinley and (French ambassador to the US Jules) Cambon signed a peace protocol that provided for Cuban independence and the cession of Puerto Rico and an island in the Marianas (Guam). It differed from the American offer of June only in that it deferred action on the Philippines to a peace conference in Paris.” ²⁹

We have another source for the actual text of the third article of that protocol: “The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a Treaty of Paris, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.” ³⁰

The signing of this document signaled two events of immense significance in the history of effective US domination of the Philippines. These events came the day after, and almost four full months thence.

Right the following day, on 13 August, the American troops moved through a line of Filipino encirclement north of Manila, and the Spanish garrison in Intramuros surrendered to Dewey without any resistance.  The guerrillas were completely denied access as per their script of collusion, and the American troops occupied the city.

All American avowals of merely just intending to help drive out the Spanish rule and help the cause of Filipino independence were unceremoniously thrown out the window on that infamous day.  A nationalist poem, Kung Tuyo na ang Luha Mo, Aking Bayan (When Your Tears Shall Have All Dried Up, My Country) written decades later by labor leader Amado V. Hernandez showed reason for tearfully mourning the snatching of the Filipino people’s hard-earned liberty on that exact date.³¹ 

August 13 has since been marked as a “date between centuries.” Specifically, it ended 333 years of Spanish rule, from 1565 which was the year the Spanish adelantado Miguel Lopez de Legazpi established the first Spanish colonial settlement in the island of Cebu (Raja Lapu-Lapu had earlier postponed Spanish colonization of the Philippines for 44 years by annihilating the Fernando Magallanes expedition at the Battle of Mactan); and it started the US control of Philippine society, by now spanning a century and a decade (“Four score and thirty years…” in this writer’s opening parody).  And still counting.

 The second event, or series of events, started off by the McKinley-Cambon protocol pertained to negotiations, signing and precarious ratification of the Treaty of Paris, where the Americans secured an “official receipt” to “legally own” the Filipinos and our homeland.

Negotiating and Signing the Treaty

In accordance with the August 12 protocol, commissioners from both the United States and Spain were finally able to meet in Paris on October 1, 1898. They were tasked to produce a treaty that would bring a formal end to the war after six months of hostilities. This was the reason why the resulting document was set to be titled, “Treaty of Peace.”

The American peace commission consisted of William R. Day, Sen. Cushman K. Davis, Sen. William P. Frye, Sen. George Gray, and the Honorable Whitelaw Reid. The Spanish commission was headed by Don Eugenio Montero Rios, the President of the Senate; Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown; Don Jose de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and associate justice of the Supreme Court. Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, General of Division. Jules Cambon, a French diplomat, also negotiated on Spain’s behalf.

The American commissioners negotiated in a hostile atmosphere because all Europe, except England, was sympathetic to the Spanish side.

Although the Conference discussed Cuba and debt questions, the major conflict concerned the situation of the Philippines. Admiral Dewey’s victory had come as a great surprise and it marked the entrance of the United States into the Pacific.

Spanish commissioners argued that Manila had surrendered after the armistice and therefore the Philippines could not be demanded as a war conquest, but they eventually yielded because they had no other choice, and the U.S. ultimately paid Spain 20 million dollars for possession of the Philippines.³²  The islands of Puerto Rico and Guam were also placed under American control, and Spain relinquished its claim to Cuba.

It is instructive to read some of the cabled communications among Americans who were stationed in three cities: Washington, D.C., which has been the capital of the U.S. federal government; Manila, the capital city of the erstwhile colonial government of Spain in the Philippines; and Paris, the capital city of France which was the venue of the negotiations between US and Spain. 

Here’s an informative series of communications as carried in the Internet site called the “Centennial Site” (designed by the MSC Communications Technologies, and hosted by MSC Computer Training Center):³³

Cabled from Manila (undated), Mr. Wilcox, in a report to Admiral Dewey: “They (the Filipinos, led by Gen. Aguinaldo) desire the protection of the United States at sea, but fear any interference on land... On one point they seem united, viz., that whatever our government (of the United States) may have done for them, it had not gained the right to annex (them).” 

Cabled from Washington (Sept 16, 1898): "Instructions to the Peace Commissioners [William Day (Ohio, Republican) ... Whitelaw Reid, Republican, ... three members of the US Senate: Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota, William P. Frye, of Maine, Republicans, and George Gray, of Delaware, Democrat]: It is my earnest with that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. … The lustre and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confidently tested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us … into an adventurous departure on untried paths.  By elaborate rhetorical gradations, the instructions finally got down to this: Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity … The United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon."

Cabled from Paris (October 1, 1898): The first meeting with the Spanish Commissioners took place at Paris, October 1st.  “Spanish communication represents,” says Judge Day’s cablegram to the President, “that status quo has been altered and continues to be altered to the prejudice of Spain by Tagalo rebels, whom it describes as an auxiliary force to the regular American troops.”

Cabled from Paris (October 7, 1898) On October 7th, the Commission telegraphed Washington that General Merritt attaches much weight to the opinion of the Belgian consul at Manila, M. Andre, and that “Consul says United States must take all or nothing”; that “if southern islands remained with Spain they would be in constant revolt and United States would have a second Cube”; that “Spanish government would not improve” and “would still protect monks in their extortion.”  General Anderson in cor-respondence with Aguinaldo in June and July seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and native authorities, but subsequently changed his tone. Merritt and Dewey both kept clear of any compromising communications.

Cabled from Paris (October 25, 1898) In the memorandum of their views telegraphed to Washington on October 25th, Messrs. Davis, Frye and Reid also say: Public opinion in Europe, including that of Rome, expects us to retain the whole Philippine Islands. The Government of the Unites States is unable to modify the proposal heretofore made for the cession of the entire archipelago of the Philippine Islands, but the American Commissioners are authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cession should be agreed to, the sum of $20,000,000.   This alluring offer was accompanied with the stern announcement that  “Upon the acceptance … of the proposals herein made … but not otherwise, it will be possible … to proceed to the consideration … of other matters.   Also, the US Commissioners wired Washington: "If the Spanish Commissioners refuse our proposition, …  nothing remains except to close the negotiations."

Cabled from Washington: “Your proposed action approved.”

Cabled from Paris (December 10,1898) Mr. Day to Mr. Hay:  “Treaty signed at 8:50 this evening.”

The treaty was signed on December 10, 1898, on behalf of the President of the United States of America and of Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain (in turn, in the name of “her august son," Don Alfonso XIII).

Reactions to the Signed Treaty

A comprehensive opposition to the signing of that Treaty was immediately expressed on behalf of the direct stakeholders, the Filipinos, by Felipe Agoncillo, who had been sent by the Aguinaldo government but was ignored completely by both the Spanish and the American diplomats and even by the French who were at that time hosting the talks and the subsequent signing.

Agoncillo said:

“If the Spaniards have not been able to transfer to the Americans the rights which they did not possess; if the latter have not militarily conquered positions in the Philippines; if the occupation of Manila was a resultant fact, prepared by the Filipinos; if the international officials and representatives of the Republic of the United States of America offered to recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Philippines, solicited and accepted their alliance, how can they now constitute themselves as arbiters of the control, administration and future government of the Philippine Islands?

“If in the Treaty of Paris there had simply been declared the withdrawal and abandonment by the Spaniards of their domination – if they had such – over Filipino territory, if America, on accepting peace, had signed the Treaty, without prejudice to the rights of the Philippines, and with a view to coming to a subsequent settlement with the existing Filipino National Government, thus recognizing the sovereignty of the latter, their alliance and the carrying out of their promises of honor to the said Filipinos, no protest against their action would have been made. But in view of the terms of the Article III of the Protocol, the attitude of the American Com-missioners, and the imperative necessity of safeguarding the national rights of my country, I take this protest, for the before-mentioned reasons but with the proper legal reservations, against the action taken and the resolutions passed by the Peace Commissioners at Paris and in the Treaty signed by them.” ³⁴

On what basis could Agoncillio declare publicly (and officially on behalf of the Aguinaldo government) that the Spaniards were transferring “the rights that they did not possess”?  Even before the scripted Battle of Manila Bay could start, even logically a part of the Spanish reason for such scripting, the Filipino revolutionaries and the native peoples had overwhelming control over most of the archipelago and had in fact laid siege on the walled capital city. 

Constantino quotes Otis, Anderson and Dewey, in that order:

“For three and one half months, the insurgents on land had kept Manila tightly bottled.” ³⁵

“We had Manila and Cavite.  The rest of the island was held not by Spaniards but by Filipinos.” ³⁶

“It is a fact that (the insurgents) were in possession, they had gotten pretty much the whole thing except Manila.” ³⁷

And UP-Manila’s Professor Benjamin Mangubat said in his blog, as translated by the author from Filipino:

“Actually, at the time of (August 1898, before the US troops marched into the walled capital), the Spaniards had only two places in the Philippines in their control: Intramuros, which was the seat of the Spanish colonial regime, and Baler, where they still had forces who had not yet surrendered to the Filipinos ”³⁸

Apolinario Mabini’s letter addressed “To the People of the United States,” published in La Independencia on July 21, 1899, traced step- by-step American actions in the Philippines during the first three months of US occupation.

The abovequoted article of Dr. Lilia Laurel in National Midweek describes how Mabini’s letter pointed out that Admiral Dewey and other American military commanders had initially expressed the friendship of their government and their support of Philippine liberties.  But much later, advancing some reason or another, the Americans took over areas already in the hands of the revolutionary army, declaring them off-limits to Filipino soldiers and citizens alike.  For instance, pressured by General Wesley Merritt, Filipino forces were practically pushed out of Ermita, Paco, Malate and Pandacan, towns which had been wrested from the Spaniards at great cost in the campaign to smash the Spaniards in Manila.

Mabini concluded his letter thus:

“The Filipino people are fighting and will fight on in defense of their liberties and independence, with the same tenacity and perseverance which they have shown in their sufferings.  They are sustained by faith in the justice of its cause.  They know that if the Americans deny them justice there is a Providence that punishes the crimes of individuals as well as peoples.

“The great nation of Washington and Lincoln should know that, no matter how great she is, she cannot annihilate the aspirations of eight million souls who are fully conscious of their strengths, honor and rights.  Blood does not choke; rather, it fertilizes great ideas and the eternal principles…”³⁹

By these very words, Mabini was echoing the words written earlier by Jose Rizal in "The Philippines, Within A Century" (part IV), which was published in La Solidaridad:

“Very likely the Philippines will defend with inexpressible valor the liberty secured at the price of so much blood and sacrifice. …”⁴⁰

In another letter, also shared with us by Dr. Laurel, titled “The Mission of the Revolution," dated September 6, 1899, Mabini shows the distinction between a “natural right” and the right established by men or nations by arms:

“We are fighting for a right that God has granted us; the Americans are fighting for a right established by men who have rebelled against God, trusting in the force of their power, and blinded by their ambition. If America triumphs, she will acquire the jus in re right in the Philippines and other powers will make haste to recognize her as the absolute owner of the former!” ⁴¹

Those who concluded that Filipinos were unfit for self-rule obviously did not get to know about the great minds of Rizal and Mabini, or of Emilio Jacinto who gave us the very quotable line, “The humanity of all is one,”⁴² or of Andres Bonifacio who brilliantly strategized the victorious revolutionary war against Spanish colonial forces, which did attain victory after two years, even though he had been killed almost halfway through that period upon orders given by Aguinaldo who had also ordered the Filipino forces to abandon the struggle after another half-year.⁴³

US Domestic Moves for Ratification

Having the Treaty of Paris ratified was no mean feat for the Republican administration of President McKinley, that had to confront a growing opposition led by the Anti-Imperialist League and a complex maze of politicians in the Senate who were breaking party ranks in forming their respective positions on the issue.  On the homestretch, the President had to bring in the military as the wild but hidden card.

The state of Massachusetts – with Faneuil Hall in Boston – was the bailiwick of the Anti-Imperialist League, which carried the brunt of efforts to oppose the annexation of the Philippines before and even after the Senate’s ratification vote.⁴⁴

The senator from that state was Sen. George Frisbee Hoar. He delivered speeches, which were among the sharpest critiques on McKinley’s policy for annexation of the Philippines in pursuit of the Treaty of Paris.  Examples of his quotable quotes are:

“The downfall of the American Republic will date from the administration of William McKinley.”⁴⁵

(The nation, having just abolished slavery,) is now being asked to accept the principle “that it is right to conquer, buy and subject a whole nation if we happen to deem it for their good. … (paraphrasing Abraham Lincoln:) “No nation was ever created good enough to own another.”⁴⁶

The big dilemma faced by Hoar was that even as he was firmly against the ratification of the treaty, he was the partymate of the President who was rooting for ratification.  He sought to reconcile this by saying he just wanted to be a “good Republican,” trying to save the party “from its own mistakes.”⁴⁷

Basis for this last mentioned attempt may logically be the official position of the Republican Party, as described by the prospectus of the Springfield Daily Republican:

“The Republican firmly believes in the American principles of government and society.  It does not doubt that through democracy are the people to attain the largest measure of happiness and well being. … It is opposed to imperialism and militarism, to the domination of wealth and aristocracy.  It sees in the purchase and conquest of the Philippine islands new evidence of the unceasing efforts of incorporated and syndicated wealth to conduct national affairs at the expense of the great body of the people.”⁴⁸

Although he remained an opponent of the Treaty through to the end, his situation effectively “clipped his wings” as an active campaigner as soon as McKinley cracked the whip to shove his partymates into line.

By that time, McKinley had already, allegedly, been told by God to “take the Philippines,” after the former had supposedly prayed fervently for guidance from the latter.  The President had declared to a group of visiting ministers:

“The truth is I didn’t want the Philippines, and when they came to us as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. . . . I sought counsel from all sides — Democrats as well as Republicans — but got little help.

“I thought first we would only take Manila; then Luzon, then other islands, perhaps, also.  I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way — I don’t know how it was, but it came:

“1) That we could not give them back to Spain — that would be cowardly and dishonorable.

“2) That we could not turn them over to France or Germany, our commercial rivals in the Orient — that would be bad business and discreditable.

“3) That we could not leave them to themselves — they were unfit for self-government — and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was; and

“4) That there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed and went to sleep and slept soundly.” ⁴⁹

Hoar’s diametrical opposite in this regard was Democrat Sen. William Jennings Bryan, who campaigned for the ratification of the Treaty with the intention of using its predictably bloody aftermath to later destroy the Republican Party. Actually, the Democrats had enough votes to block the ratification, which would need two-thirds or 56 of the votes in the 84-member body. Early in the Senate debates, Democrat Sen. Arthur Gorman could estimate with confidence that no more than four Democratic senators would vote yes to the Treaty.

But party leader Bryan decided to vote for ratification and asked fellow-Democrats to do likewise. Privately, he told fellow-senators that the treaty should be passed, then if the Republican administration would wage war to conquer the Philippines, they would be driven out of power.   Publicly, however, he declared that the Treaty was about restoring peace.⁵⁰

Not all who opposed ratification did so for noble reasons.  For example, Sen. Gorman opposed it, warning of white-brown inter-marriages that it would likely facilitate in big numbers. He said assimilation of the Filipinos, a colored people, would “degrade” the white Americans.⁵¹

Many of the organizations that supported the stand of the Anti-Imperialist League actually represented protectionist interests and not out of any sympathy with the Filipinos’ hard-won quest for liberty.  They feared competition from Filipino goods in the domestic market.  This phenomenon was an important part of the basis why the Anti-Imperialists were confident that opposition to the Treaty would be growing with every passing week.   Such growth was the reason why the AIL batted for postponement in the Senate voting on the proposed Treaty.

Among those that joined the campaign to junk the Treaty were the following: the paper-makers’ union of Holyoke, Massachusetts; a cigar-makers’ local in Boston; the trades and labor congress of Dubuque, Iowa; farmers in Georgia, Iowa, and Michigan; businessmen in Los Angeles, California; and the Nebraska State Council of Catholic Knights of America.⁵²

There was also an option floated by Sen. Bryan to ratify the treaty first and then grant independence to the Filipinos later, the Boston league mailed out to all members of both Houses of the US Congress a statement arguing that it would only take a little over a third of the senators to defeat the treaty but subsequent legislation to free the Philippines would take a majority vote of each of the Houses and the approval of the President.⁵³  (Because the treaty was ratified after these debates, this was what actually happened three decades and a half later with the enactment of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, with the Philippines having been made to pass through a ten-year protectorate – or “Commonwealth” – status.⁵⁴)

The situation in the Philippines was getting complicated due to rebel victory in driving out the Spanish forces from the city of Iloilo and occupying and governing it well. The US forces were beaten to the draw and could no longer use the excuse to take over to prevent lawlessness.  The shipload of US troops were ordered not to land their vessel for fear of starting a skirmish that would surely be blamed on them by impartial observers.⁵⁵

McKinley realized he could no longer afford to wait for the very uncomfortable impasse to be broken. And so he decided to hurry up the Senate vote and cracked the party whip and engaged in subtle and outright vote buying to secure the number of votes he needed for ratification.⁵⁶

The clincher solution he saw was using the military card.  As he was very careful not to trigger an incident in Iloilo, he was the opposite in Manila, giving orders to start the war with heavier provocations.

These included: (1) commanding Gen. Arthur MacArthur to station artillery near US troops in Pandacan and to order these troops to force out the Filipino soldiers from their hitherto entrenched position there; (2) issuing an announcement through the American members of the joint commission to their Filipino counterparts that this body was not to meet anymore; (3) giving Lt. John Hall and several regimental com-manders orders to bring about a conflict with the Filipino officers as much as possible; (4) giving orders to Col. John Stotsenberg to duplicate the Pandacan maneuver in Santol; and (5) making the US Navy dismiss all its Filipino employees on February 3, the day before the first shooting incident, pre-scripted and all, was to take place.⁵⁷

February 4 was the day that Gen. Otis countermanded instructions given months earlier to avoid conflict with the Filipinos.  He told his officers and troops to open fire on insurgent “intruders.”  That afternoon, American troops were all put under arms. When evening fell, Pvt. Willie Grayson and a friend named Miller were on sentry duty at Santol. They were ordered to patrol ahead of the village in an unoccupied area the Filipino troops claimed to control, and after proceeding as ordered, they waited to see if there were any insurgents in the vicinity.⁵⁸ 

Grayson later gave this account:

“About eight o’clock… something rose slowly up not twenty feet in front of us.  It was a Filipino. I yelled ‘Halt!’… He immediately shouted ‘Halto!’ at me.  Well, I thought the best thing to do was to shoot him. He dropped. … Then, two Filipinos sprang out of a gateway about fifteen feet from us.  I called ‘Halt!’ and Miller fired and dropped one.  I saw that another was left. Well, I think I got my second Filipino that time.  We retreated to where our six other fellows were, and I said, ‘Line up, fellows, the niggers are in here all through these yards.”⁵⁹  (Grayson later complained that the ‘dumb bullheadedness of the officers in invading insurgent territory was responsible for making him fire those shots.)

The Filipino troops in the area returned fire.  General Arthur MacArthur later gave his account on what happened next:

“We had a pre-arranged plan. Our tactical arrangements there were very perfect, indeed.  Everything was connected by wire.  … and within an instant after at the outpost I received a message from Stotsenberg… ‘The pipe line outpost has been fired on; and I am moving out with my entire regiment.’ … When I got Col. Stotsenberg’s report, I simply wired all commanders to carry out pre-arranged plans, and the whole division was placed on the firing line.” ⁶⁰

Recoiling from the US Army attack (supported by fire from Dewey’s ships) that brought large casualty figures among the Filipino troops, Aguinaldo sent a message to Otis saying the incident the previous night was an accident that happened without his approval, and asking for a ceasefire and the establishment of neutral areas between their respective troops.  Otis replied, in effect saying that the fighting, having begun, must be brought to the grim end.⁶¹  .

But the Administration spread its own fictitious story and stuck to it: The insurgents had “fired on (our) flag,” brought the conflict on, and was responsible for it.⁶²

After these were reported to Washington, both President McKinley and Sen. Lodge confidently expressed in separate conversations that they were sure the events in Manila would “insure the ratification of the treaty tomorrow.”⁶³

They were both right. The military card, coupled with the consistent pattern of deception, did its job in the endgame of the campaign to ratify the treaty that they had signed almost two months before in Paris!  

Precarious Vote Ratifies Pact

A last-ditch appeal to the Senate was made asking the senators to junk the treaty. Signatories included former President Stephen Grover Cleaveland with two non-consecutive earlier terms at the White House as 22nd (1885-1889) and 24th  (1893-1897) chief executive, and Scottish-born American businessman and major philanthropist Andrew Carnegie.  Other signatories included former Secretary of the Treasury John G. Carlisle, Harvard University president Charles W. Eliot, American Federation of Labor president Samuel Gompers, Moorfield Storey and others.   This appeal was written by Charles Francis Adams, assisted by Carl Schurz.⁶⁴

The Treaty of Paris needed 56 votes, cast by two-thirds of the 84 senators, On February 6, 1899, it got 57.  The cause of imperialist expansionism got the ratification it had sought, but with only one more vote to spare. 

Considering the twists and turns of the shifting stances of some Senators, with their complex alliances of accident and convenience, crossing party affiliations, so close to the moment of decision, it was a close call even for the victors who had real reasons to get apprehensive.  Thus, the eleventh-hour voting and the ignition into a shooting war the long-festering tensions between US and Filipino troops were frantically resorted to, albeit with well-established patterns of deception and bribery.  And the newly formed alliance between the expansionist big business and the military eager to do its bidding won out.

Author Daniel Schirmer offers an incisive post-mortem in his book:

“The pressure generated by industry, the military, by partisan and personal interests proved too great.  The atmosphere of racism and chauvinism was too pervasive.  The Massachusetts men who fought the treaty believed that, given time, they could muster an overwhelming popular opposition, and the success of their efforts gave support to this belief.  Whether such a movement could have been built or not was not tested; the collapse of the fight against the treaty at its weak political center removed that possibility.

“In the treaty crisis, if the views of the leading participants are taken into account, both parties must be held responsible for its passage, with the Republicans carrying the major burden.  Both Republicans and Democrats proved incapable of expressing the popular opposition to the treaty, because both were incapable of resisting the pressure of big business and its allied military interests.  The national legislature, which had brought into being the union of industry and the military, was in turn dominated by its creature; the child devoured the parent in the reverse of the legend.  Not to be discounted, either, was the influence of William McKinley.  In the midst of this decisive series of events, the President came forward to offer sinuous leadership to the political and military machines, and the ends desired by his supporters in industry and finance were achieved.  The treaty was passed, the war with the Philippines begun, and the United States set on an imperial course.”⁶⁵

It turned out to be a very gloomy day for Filipino sovereignty and for all its allies. And the war that was ignited to clinch that Senate vote was to last the bigger part of the new decade that was then about to start. 

And American domination of the Philippine peoples and their Islands has so far lasted – through three stages in as many forms – beyond the entire century that was then about to start, with a decade or so to spare!

Brutal War to Enforce the Sale

Present generations of the American people and the Filipino people know practically nothing about the Filipino-American war, which the United States started treacherously on February 4, 1899 to clinch the US Senate’s vote to ratify the Treaty of Paris two days later.  Con-sidering the habit of the MacKinley administration of telling lies to its own citizens, information about the extent and barbarity of that war, which was supposed to have lasted only three years according to American official history but actually lasted 16 years,⁶⁶ information on it had to be consolidated and propagated through the efforts of the Anti-Imperialist League and its fraternal organizations.

But even Filipinos know next to nothing about that highly atrocious undeclared war, where we lost roughly a million of our ancestors as direct and indirect casualties. This was because our history was written according to the program of Civil Governor William Howard Taft, and eventually latter-day people were simply made to forget it. The Department of Education decided about a decade ago to downplay it or remove it from the official syllabus for history subjects, and during the climax parade in the mega-expensive official commemoration of the Philippine Independence in June 1998, there were floats on all other chapters of Philippine history except the Filipino-American War.  

Five years before, this author wrote an article for the “Sense of History” section of Health Alert, the fortnightly publication of Health Action Information Network (HAIN) in the Philippines:⁶⁷

The American people, at that time, were being fed with lies by their own government as far as its war of aggression in the Philippines was concerned. First, they pictured us as “tailless monkeys” virtually “living in the trees” as savages. (They even popularized a song about such “monkeys” having no tails in “Far Zamboanga,” which was later edited to have more decent lyrics.)⁶⁸

Then, the American policymakers said the Filipinos were asking the United States for protection and guidance, probably using to the hilt that fly-in-the-ointment passage which turned General Aguinaldo’s declaration of independence into a proclamation of a protectorate. (Aguinaldo declared “independence” in June 1898 but qualified this to be “under the protection of the Mighty and Humane North American Nation.”⁶⁹

"They added, too, that there was practically no resistance here, save for some small bands of bandits in the boondocks. All these, of course, were filthy lies. And the lies were coupled with silence about brutal atrocities being committed by the American troops against large sections of the population, leading up to a Filipino (direct) casualty figure of no less than 600,000.

"In January of 1899, the Filipinos established the very first republic in the Asian continent, and their forces had effective control over practically the entire archipelago, save for the walled capital city of Manila (Intramuros) then already in the hands of the Americans.

"(The Americans’) control of Manila was not a mere contingency started with concern for the safety of their defeated fellow Caucasians, the Spaniards. The United States had her own designs on the Philippines as its first trophy to herald its late-day entry into the exclusive club of colonial powers.

"When the Treaty of Paris was submitted to the US Senate for ratification, that body was not at all eager to give the document the needed majority approval. Something had to be done to sway public opinion decisively in favor of annexation of the Philippines in order to make good McKinley’s crossed-fingers prediction: “While the treaty has not yet been ratified, it is believed that it will be by the time of the arrival at Manila of the commissioners.” Before the civilian commissioners, therefore, that would take care of governance; they had to send over in droves the reinforcements for their thinly spread invasion forces.

"The strength of the Philippine revolutionary armed forces was enough to defeat the Spaniards, but not enough for the sheer might of the reinforced American invasion and occupation forces.

"The Philippine-American War was, therefore, a war of aggression, on the one hand, and the continuation of a war of national liberation, on the other. Toward that war’s end, no less than 600,000 Filipino lives had been snuffed. It was the forcible end, the crushing, of the Philippine Republic, which was established after the Philippine Revolution of 1896  had ended 333 years of Spanish rule.

The Philippine-American War was officially acknowledged by the US government only as an “insurgency.”  But this was a blatant mislabeling, considering its actual duration, scope of areas involved, size of the US troops deployed, and total cost entailed in terms of budget and casualties.  It was, in fact, the “mother of all American wars” in terms of historical chronology: the US military tactics of reconcentration (“hamletting”) and of employing the “water cure” and other forms of torture were tested in the islands for later mastery elsewhere; and this was the first war of aggression waged by the US after its expansionist economic platform emerged and gave rise to its imperialist policy in foreign relations.

(For more information including details, see Appendix 2-B.)

ANNOUNCEMENTS:  Demands 

of Dignity

THE HARDCOPY EDITION, 

in about 180 regular sized bookpaper pages with full-color paperback cover

(prices, arrangements).

FREE ACCESS FOR ALL 

to the ON-LINE EDITION until February. 4, 2009, 110th Anni- versary of the Fil-Am War.

.(access arrangements).   

 APPENDICES: 

App 2-A: Treaty of Paris, 1898  

App 2-B: War to Enforce Sale

 'FOOTNOTES': 

  ¹Full text in Appendix 2-A. Source: Library of Congress <loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/subjects.html.>

  ²Howard Zinn,"The Empire and the People," History is a Weapon,

  ³Renato Constantino, "Origin of a Myth," Dissent and Counter- Consciousness, (Quezon City: Malaya Books), p. 72., quoting George Taylor, America in the New Pacific (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942),

  ⁴Zinn, Ibid.

  ⁵John W. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin an Company, 1903), pp. 401-402, as cited by Renato Constantino, Ibid., pp. 72-73.

  ⁶US Congressional Record, 56th Congress. Full text of this speech is available at <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad.intrel

/ajb72.htm>

  ⁷Wikiquote, <http://216.101.

58.17/hs/rschaller/Desktop/AP%20DBQ%20

Folder/1875-1900/7.0%20Expansionism.doc>

  ⁸Daniel Boone Schirmer, Republic or Empire (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972), the entire book; on reciprocal relationship with Filipino nationalist movement, pp. 65-66.

  ⁹Zinn, Ibid.

¹⁰Ed Aurelio Reyes (quoting Dr. Ambeth Ocampo and Dr. Milagros Guerrero), Bonifacio: Siya Ba Ay Kilala Ko? (English Version; title translates as ‘Bonifacio: Do I Really Know Him?’) (Manila: Kamalaysayan, 2004), pp. 43-51.

¹¹Prof. Dante L. Ambrosio, "Rebolusyong 1896: Isang Pambansang Rebolusyon," TAP Pamphlet Series by the Education Forum’s Teacher Assistance Program (Quezon City: Education Forum, 1994).

¹²Jose Rizal was exiled in the small town of Dapitan (now a city in Zamboanga del Norte). A detailed biography of the hero (José Barón Fernandez, José Rizál: Filipino Doctor and Patriot (Manila: Manuel L. Morato, 1980) describes the place as the "distant island of Mindanao, mostly terra incognita and dominated by Mohammedan datus, was the ideal place." p. 242. (boldface emphasis mine)

¹³Santiago V. Alvarez, as translated into English by Paula Carolina S. Malay, The Katipunan and the Revolution: Memoirs of a General (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992), pp. 82-119.

¹⁴According to historian Teodoro A. Agoncilio (History of the Filipino People, eighth edition, R. P. Garcia Publishing Co., Quezon City, 1990, p. 184), the political settlement was covered by a truce document signed by representatives of the Spanish colonial government and the Aguinaldo-led forces in Biyak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan on December 15, 1897. The truce document provided, among other things" (1) that Aguinaldo and his companions would go into voluntary exile outside the Philippines; (2) that Spanish Gov. Gen. Primo de Rivera would pay the sum of P800,000 to the rebels in three installments: (a) P400,000 to Aguinaldo upon his departure from Biyak na Bato, (b) P200,000 when the arms surrendered by the revolutionists exceeded 700, and (c) the remaining P200,000 when the Te Deum was sung and general amnesty was proclaimed by the governor; and (3) that Primo de Rivera would pay the additional sum of P900,000 to the families of the non-combatant Filipinos who suffered during the armed conflict.

¹⁵Prof. Bernard L.M. Karganilla, "Hobbled Sovereignty" (column item), Malaya national news­paper, June 15, 2007. Karganilla’s column item indicates as his source the True Version of the Philippine Revolution by Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy (the book published by Dodo Press in 2006 or the webpage <http://www.authorama.com/true-version

-of-the-philippine-revolution.html>), but similar information may be derived from the following sources: paragraph 1, see under endnote number 15 below; paragraph 2, see under endnote number 16 below; paragraph 5, additional information in 55th Congress, (US) Senate Document No. 62, (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1899) Part 2, pp. 333-334; paragraph 8, corroborated by Paragraph 9 & 14; paragraph 10, see also endnote 26 on p. 65.

¹⁶Schirmer, Ibid., p. 68, citing Nathan Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the Manila Campaign (Naval Historical Foundation, 1947), p. 16; L. H. Healey and L. Kutner, The Admiral (Chicago & New York: Ziff-Davis publishing company, 1944), pp. 157-158,

¹⁷Constantino, Ibid., pp. 72-73, quoting US Senate Document 62, p. 356 as cited by James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines (New York and London: The Knickerbacker Press, 1912), p.13.

¹⁸David Trask, "The Spanish-American War," (part of the series, titled, The World of 1898: The Spanish-American War, Website of Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898

/trask.html>.

¹⁹Constantino, Ibid., p. 73. quoting George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (1900-1950) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1953), p. 13.

²⁰Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle

²¹David Trask, ibid.

²²Wall of Heroes website, <home

ofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/

18_treaty.html>

²³Constantino, Ibid., p. 75. quoting US Senate Document 331, Pt 3, p. 2928 as cited by James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines (New York and London: The Knickerbacker Press, 1912) p. 20.

²⁴Dr. Lilia H. Laurel, "The Legacy of Apolinario Mabini," National Midweek magazine, August 16, 1989, p. 13

²⁵Constantino, Ibid., p. 75.

²⁶Constantino, Ibid., p. 76. quoting US Senate Document 331, Pt 3, p. 2928 as cited by James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines (New York and London: The Knickerbacker Press, 1912) p. 67.

²⁷Ibid., p. 76, citing Blount, Ibid., pp. 58-59

²⁸Constantino, Ibid., p. 76, quoting Blount, p. 82

²⁹David Trask, Ibid.

³⁰Source: Centennial Site designed by Management Systems Consultants (MSC) Communi

cations Technologies, Inc. Hosted by MSC Computer Training Center. Updated January 2, 1999. <http://ww

w.msc.edu.ph/centennial/philam.html>

³¹Kung Tuyo Na ang Luha Mo, Aking Bayan, written by Amado V. Hernandez carries these stanzas:

³²Website of Library of Congress, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/

chronology.html#treaty>.

³³Source: Centennial Site designed by MSC Communications Technologies, Inc. Hosted by MSC Computer Training Center. Updated January 2, 1999. http://www.msc.edu.ph/centennial/

philam.html

³⁴Source: Wikkipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Felipe_Agoncillo

³⁵Constantino, Ibid., p. 78, quoting Annual Reports of the War Department, 1899, Vol. I, Pt. 4, p. 13.

³⁶Constantino, Ibid., p. 79, quoting Blount, Ibid., p. 70

³⁷Constantino, Ibid., p. 79, quoting Senate Document 331, 1902, p. 941, quoted in Blount, Ibid., p. 70

³⁸Prof. Benjamin Mangubat, blogsite with URL:

³⁹As quoted in Laurel, Ibid.

⁴⁰Jose Rizal, "The Philippines Within A Century," La Solidaridad, 1889, as carried in Ed Aurelio C. Reyes, The Philippines, A Century Thence (An Open Letter to Rizal), (Manila: Kamalaysayan, 2007), p. 64.

⁴¹As quoted in Laurel, Ibid.

⁴²Emilio Jacinto’s exact line in his essay, "Liwanag at Dilim" (Light and Darkness) goes this way: "Ang lahat ng tao’y magkakapantay sapagkat iisa ang pagkatao ng lahat." (All humans are equal because the humanity of all is one), translated by the author from Tagalog text in Virgilio S. Almario, Panitikan ng Rebolusyon(g 1896) (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1997), p. 169.

⁴³Reyes, Bonifacio, quoting in various parts Dr. Milagros Guerrero, "Andres Bonifacio: Pangulo ng Haring Bayan" (unpublished monograph), and Dr. Zeus Salazar, Dante Ambrosio and Enrico Azicate, Agosto 29-30, 1896: Ang Pagsalakay ni Bonifacio sa Maynila (Manila: Miranda Book Store, 1994).

⁴⁴Schirmer, Ibid. In the Philippines, the most well-known figure being associated to the Anti-Imperialist League is Samuel Clemens, more widely known as the novelist Mark Twain of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn fame. Although his fame was indeed well-deserved due to the sharpness of his pen serving well the anti-imperialist cause (in general and the cause of Philippine independence in particular), Schirmer’s book which traces the details of the AIL’s history from its birth to its demise, mentions Clemens only once – as among the prominent persons who were co-signatories to an AIL-prepared statement pertaining to the betrayed promise of guaranteeing Cuban independence. The long-term leaders of AIL were: former Massachusetts Gov. George S. Boutwell, president; Union Army Gen. Francis A. Osborn, treasurer; and Erwing Winslow, secretary; a long list of vice presidents that included steel magnate Andrew Carnegie and labor leader Samuel Gompers. All those who sent in their names to the Boston headquarters were to be enrolled as members, and membership meetings were to be set at least once a year. The key to the organization, however, from the very start, was an executive committee of about ten members who met twice a week and were responsible for the work.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 109.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 116.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 115,

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 1, quoting Springfield Daily Republican, January 6, 1900

⁴⁹Zinn, Ibid.

⁵⁰ Schirmer, Ibid., p. 110, quoting R. F. Pettigrew, Imperial Washington (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Company, 1922), p. 270.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 119, citing the Boston Evening Transcript, February 6, 1899; and Review of Reviews, March 1899, p. 267.

⁵²Ibid., p. 115, citing Springfield Daily Republican, January 10, 1899

⁵³Ibid., p. 108. citing Springfield Daily Republican, December 21 & 24, 1898

⁵⁴Agoncilio, Ibid., p. 416.

⁵⁵Schirmer, Ibid., pp. 112-114, 125, citing the Boston Evening Transcript, January 3 and January 5, 1899;

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 122-125. quoting Pettigrew, pp. 204-205.

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 127-128, quoting the Report of Major General E. S. Otis, 1899; Compilation of Philippine Insurgent Records (later retitled Philippine Revolutionary Records), pp. 42-43; Speech of Lieutenant Hall at Fanueil Hall, March 19, 1903, as printed in Mass Meetings of Protest (Boston: New England Anti-Imperialist League, 1903); 57th Congress, 1st sess., Senate Document No. 331, Part 2, Hearings on the Philippines, MacArthur’s Testimony, pp. 898-899; Philippine Insurgent Records (later retitled Philippine Revolutionary Records), pp. 42-43, Teodoro A. Agoncilio and Oscar M. Alfonso, A Short History of the Filipino People (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1960), p. 266.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 128-129, quoting from Report of the War Department, 1899, pp. 462, 464.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 129, quoting from Charles Edward Russel, The Outlook for the Philippines (New York: The Century Co., 1922), p. 93.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 129, citing the 57th Congress, 1st Sess., Senate Document No. 331, Part 2, Senate Hearings on the Philippines, MacArthur’s Testimony, p. 900.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 130, quoting Boston Evening Transcript, February 11, May 8, 1899.

⁶²Ibid., p. 132.

⁶³Ibid., p. 130, citing Richard Brinsley Sheridan, The Filipino Martyrs (London and New York: J. Lane, 1900), p. 169.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 132-133, citing Springfield Daily Republican, February 6, 1899; diary of Charles Francis Adams, Jr., January 25, 28 & 31, 1899, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Papers, MHS.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 133.

⁶⁶The three stages: Invasion and "pacification" during the Filipino-American War (1899-1915); direct colonial subjugation after "pacification" before and during the "Commonwealth" period (1902-1942); and indirect colonial (semi-colonial) through policies, programs and operations implemented by a native government that also absorbs all blame on the effects of these policies ("independent republic," 1946-?).

⁶⁷see http://www.tribo.org/history/american.html

⁶⁸The original opening line, "Yo, the monkeys have no tails in Zamboo-anga" was later changed to "Don’t you go, don’t you go to far Zamboanga."

⁶⁹The crucial sentence in the Acta de Independencia translates into English as: "And having as witness to the rectitude of our intentions the Supreme Judge of the Universe, and under the protection of the Mighty and Humane North-American nation, we do proclaim and declare solemnly in the name and by the authority of the people of all these Philippine islands…"